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Abstract
Despite evidence highlighting the multiple benefits that liberalization can have in the agricultural sector, agricultural protectionism 
is abundant, especially in developing countries. Chile provides an interesting case on this topic because it implemented an aggressive 
liberalization in the agricultural sector during the 1970s and 1980s. This paper analyzes the impact of farm protectionism on the use of 
agricultural inputs in Chile. To do this, we estimated partial elasticities of substitution by incorporating government protectionism as a 
factor for agricultural production. Our findings reveal that increased protectionism decreases agricultural labor and promotes the use of 
fixed capital. In contrast, protectionism has no effect on the use of working capital and land. This information shows a clear transference 
from the government to farmers. Furthermore, our results are useful for anticipating the effects that varying levels of government 
protectionism can have on the Chilean agricultural sector over time. 
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Introduction
The agricultural sector is particularly important for 
developing countries. In the first steps of development, 
economic growth is mainly driven by the agricultural 
sector. Its importance diminishes as countries develop 
and other economic sectors become more prominent. 
A characteristic that distinguishes the agricultural 
sector from other sectors of the economy is the high 
level of government protection it receives. In spite of 
evidence supporting the liberalization of agriculture, 
protectionism in the agricultural sector is common 
across developed and developing economies alike 
(Swinnen, 2010; Anderson et al., 2013).
Anderson (1992) argues that liberalization not only 
promotes an increase in income in developing countries 
but also reduces negative impacts on the environment. 
Bouët et al. (2005) used an applied general equilibrium 
model to show that gains in welfare for developed 
countries from protectionism are contrasted by its 
negative effects in developing countries. Similarly, 
Panagariya (2005) discusses the negative impacts that 
protectionism in developed countries has on deve-
loping nations. Evidence on the effect of liberalization 
in the agricultural sector of developing countries is 
not conclusive. On the one hand, when implementing 
a gradual liberalization process that includes a 
strict monitoring system, Ahmed (1995, 1996) found 
positive effects of liberalization on the production of 
rice in Bangladesh. While agricultural productivity in 
Nigeria was found to decrease with higher degrees of 
openness, the volume of its exports increased (Anowor 
et al., 2013). On the other hand, Gibbon (1999), after 
studying the cotton sector in Tanzania, postulated that 
liberalization cannot ensure sustainable production. 
Rafeek & Samaratunga (2000) studied the liberaliza­
tion on the rice sector Sri Lanka, showing that, despite 
overall welfare gains in the society at-large, farmers 
experienced welfare losses. Jayne et al. (2002) discuss 
the cases of Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Zambia, and 
Zimbabwe, and argue the existence of negative impacts 
on both the private and public sectors of these econo-
mies from liberalization. In the case of Latin American 
countries, convergence in non-agricultural salaries, 
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increases in unemployment volatility, increases in mi-
gra tion, and increases in the aggregate Foreign Direct 
Invest ment were found to be effects of the NAFTA tra­
de agreement between Mexico and the USA (Leder man 
et al., 2004; Chiquiar & Hanson, 2005). For Argentina, 
there is evidence of a decrease in the labor share of 
the agricultural sector (Cavallo & Mundlak, 1982). 
Finally, Brazil decreased its inputs prices, causing an 
increase in productivity – although the overall impact 
on production was moderate and there was a decrease 
in rural employment (De Albuquerque et al., 2000). 
Chile represents an interesting case study because it ex­
perienced an aggressive liberalization on agricul tu re 
during the 1970s and 1980s, giving us the opportunity 
of better understand the effects of protectionism on 
the use of agricultural inputs. 
Agricultural protectionism started in 1815 when 
the UK imposed strong restrictions on grain imports 
(Hollander, 1992). Since then, government assistance 
for farmers has become popular, and, nowadays, it 
is a common practice around the world, especially 
in developing countries (Swinnen, 2010). This is 
an interesting issue given that there is an extensive 
amount of literature that supports liberalization in the 
agricultural sector (see, e.g., Giannakas et al., 2001; 
McCalla, 2003; Guan & Lansink, 2006). For instance, 
Hertel & Keeney (2006) and Anderson et al. (2013) 
provide evidence of the positive impacts that agricul-
tural liberalization can have on the economy. In fact, 
the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
which focuses on policies oriented at liberalizing the 
agricultural sector, is a consequence of this line of 
research (Ingco & Nash, 2004). In contrast, there is a 
different line of research that supports protectionism in 
the agricultural sector. For instance, Moon & Griffith 
(2011) argues the existence of diverse benefits of the 
agricultural production that cannot be measured or 
internalized by the market. For developing countries, 
the importance of the agricultural sector in their 
gross domestic product (GDP), labor force, political 
ideologies, and positive externalities are additional 
ar guments used in support of agricultural protectio-
nism (see, e.g., Boot & Zee, 1993; Swinnen, 1994; 
Binswanger & Deininger, 1997; Naoi & Kume, 2011; 
Lusk, 2012). As a result, agricultural protectionism is 
a relevant and controversial issue.
Chile is an interesting case for analyzing the effect 
of protectionism on agricultural production for the 
following reasons: First, Chile is still a developing 
country; however, its level of the development is 
among the highest in Latin America. For instance, 
Chile is a permanent member of the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and 
its human development index is the highest among 
Latin American countries. Second, Chile had a fairly 
open international trade policy with moderate import 
tariffs until the Great Depression. After the Great 
Depression, though, protectionism increased as the 
country’s dependence on unstable external markets was 
believed to be responsible for the economic struggles 
they experienced. Nevertheless, since the coup d'état 
in 1973, Chile has experienced an aggressive liberali­
zation in different areas of its economy. The coup d'état, 
and military government that accompanied it, lowered 
tariff rates to try and increase international trade 
(Larrain, 1982). In fact, according to the 2016 Index of 
Economic Freedom, Chile is ranked the 7th most open 
economy in the world. This trend toward free­markets 
has affected all sectors of the economy. 
The agricultural sector is an important component 
of the Chilean economy. The agri-food share of GDP 
was 7.8% in 2012, bringing in USD$13,109 million 
(ODEPA, 2013). Moreover, 7.1% of the total national 
employment comes from the agricultural sector. The 
main exports by sub­class are fresh fruit (28.2%), wood 
pulp (17.6%), wine and other alcoholic drinks (12.7%), 
and processed fruits and vegetables (10.2%). The 
Institute of Agricultural Development (INDAP) has 
been the organization under the Ministry of Agricul­
tu re in charge of managing resources for agrarian 
assistance in Chile since 1965. This institution has 
undergone various changes since its creation. Currently, 
the INDAP mainly provides indirect subsidies, credits 
for agricultural insurance, and training to farmers. 
Unlike many countries, Chile does not offer direct 
subsidies, like payments apart from production. 
The previous discussion makes it interesting to 
investigate the effects of farm protectionism on the 
agricultural sector of a country that seems to minimize 
market interventions (see a deeper discussion on 
Chilean agricultural reforms and their results in 
Valdés, 1993). Finally, empirical investigation of the 
agricultural production is not extensive for developing 
countries and especially not for Latin America. Then, 
the objective of this paper was to investigate how farm 
protectionism affects the use of agricultural inputs in 
Chile, estimating partial elasticities of substitution, and 
observing how increases in the use of a specific input 
affect the use of others.
Empirical methodology and data
Empirical methodology
Agriculture is one of the main economic sectors 
for developing economies. For this reason, farm 
protectionism is a common practice in these nations. 
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Given that the sum of the shares is one (left-hand side), 
the sum of the right-hand side will also be one, which 
implies that the error terms will not be independent of 
each other. Because conditional factor demands must 
be homogenous of degree one in prices, we arbitrarily 
dropped the equation associated with the working 
capital share. In fact, the estimates are invariant to the 
dropped equation (Barten, 1969). This allowed us to 





where εL, εF, and εN are error terms and αL, αF, and αN are 
constant terms. An important issue is that the residuals 
in system of equations (1)-(3) can be driven by the 
same factors over time. This implies that they can be 
contemporaneously correlated, leading to a biased OLS 
estimation. For this reason, we estimated this system 
of equations using Iterative Seemingly Unrelated 
Regressions (ITSUR). 
The coefficients of the system of equations (1)­(3) 
contain the information relevant to the aims of this 
paper. First, the partial elasticities of substitution (θij) 
between the four inputs can be obtained as follows:
 (5)
with i ≠ j and i,j=L, W, F, N.
Conditional on the mean-share values, we can 
obtain the standard errors of these partial elasticities of 
substitution, which allows us to test their significance. 
Inputs i and j are considered complements (substitutes) 
if their corresponding partial elasticity of substitution 
is significantly less (greater) than zero. 
Second, the αiY coefficients allow us to test 
whether the production function is homothetic or 
not. Specifically, if a cost function is separable in 
As Anderson & Nelgen (2011) show, import protection 
has been a common source of protection for farmers 
in developing countries. This implies that famers face 
less com peti tion in local markets and can maintain, 
or e ven increase, their level of production over time. 
Therefore, protection from foreign competition is 
believed to be a way in which protectionism stimulates 
agricultural production in developing countries. The 
effect of farm protectionism on agricultural production 
is supported theoretically and empirically (Henessy, 
1998; Giannakas et al., 2001; Karagiannis & Sarris, 
2005; Guan & Lansink, 2006). Thus, we define 
agricultural output as:
 
where Y is the gross agricultural output, which uses 
four inputs: labor (L), working capital (W), fixed 
capital (F), and land (N). T represents the aggregate 
technology used in the production process. These 
are the standard determinants of an agricultural-
production function (see e.g., Sharma, 1991; Kuroda, 
1997). We added A which represents farm protection. 
Government transferences can have a direct effect on 
agricultural production, i.e., technical efficiency, or 
indirect effects through productivity and technical 
changes. All of these effects can be captured by a 
log-linear functional form, which is the approach 
followed here (see McCloud & Kumbhakar, 2008, for 
a deeper discussion about ways in which government 
transferences to farmers can be modeled). Therefore, 
we followed a general specification to capture the 
effect of protectionism on the use of agricultural inputs. 
Duality implies that there is a twice­differentiable cost 
function that depends on the input prices (pi) of labor 
(i=L), working capital (i=W), fixed capital (i=F), and 
land (i=N), as well as production (Y), technology (T), 
and government transference to farmers (A), i.e. farm 
protectionism.
Assuming a translog-functional form of the cost 
function (C) allows us to obtain the conditional factor 
demands (xi) by using the Shepard's Lemma (Berndt 
& Wood, 1975; Sharma, 1991; Hadley, 2006). There­
fore, the price-demand elasticity (∂C/∂pi )(pi /C) can 
be expre s sed as pi xi /C, which implies that the price-
demand elasticity ∂ln (pi )/∂ln (C) can be interpreted as 
the i-th input share on the total cost (si ). This implies 
that by differentiating the translog­cost function 
according to the four price inputs, we can obtain four 
share equations.
To empirically estimate the system of four share 
equations, it is necessary to add a stochastic term. 
( ), , , , ,                                                                                                           (1)Y f L W F N T A=( ), , , , ,                                                                                                (1)Y f L W F N T A=
1Note that the dependent variable is a share, i.e., between 0 and 1; however, independent variables are expressed in logarithms. Therefore, a linear 
specification for equations (2)-(4) is not misled since coefficients capture percentage changes in the dependent variable.
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input prices and output, i.e., αLiY=0, the production 
function is homothetic (see a deeper discussion of 
this issue in Diewert, 1974). Therefore, a significant 
coefficient implies that the production function is 
non-homothetic, and imposing the assumption of 
homotheticity in these cases could cause a bias in our 
estimates.
Third, the αiT coefficients allow us to identify 
whether technological changes are i-th input-saving 
or input-using – that is, if a technological change 
increases the use of the i-th input, this technological 
change is i-th input-using. On the contrary, if a 
technological change decreases the use of the i-th 
input, this technological change is i-th input-saving. 
This information is useful for understanding how 
technology affects the allocation of agricultural inputs 
in the production process. 
Finally, the αiA coefficients are crucial to our analysis 
because they allow us to investigate the effect of 
protectionism on the agricultural sector through its 
impact on the use of agricultural inputs. Similar to 
technological changes, the sign and significance of 
these coefficients reveals whether farm protectionism is 
input-using or -saving. In this way, we can identify the 
inputs whose use are increased or decreased by farmers 
when those farmers receive government transferences. 
This information reveals the needs or priorities of 
farmers and is helpful for understanding the effects of 
protectionism on agricultural production. For instance, 
increases and decreases in the demand of the inputs can 
be anticipated when there is an increase or decrease in 
farm protectionism. 
Data
First of all, it is necessary to highlight that informa-
tion about agricultural inputs for developing countries 
is limited, which is why there is little empirical research 
about this topic. In order to estimate the shares for the 
four inputs in analysis, we first needed the quantities 
and prices of these inputs. The data sources and proxies 
we used are discussed below.
Agricultural employment was quantified by the 
population economically active in agriculture, which 
is freely available on the FAO database (www.faostat.
fao.org). The agricultural sector’s workforce is mainly 
composed by low­skilled workers. Even though Chile’s 
National Institute of Statistics (Instituto Nacional de 
Estadísticas, INE) has data on the average wages for 
this level of qualification, the data available only covers 
a short part of our time sample. For this reason, we 
used the minimum wage, which is available during the 
whole period in analysis. This data was obtained from 
the INE website (www.ine.cl).
The amount of land was measured by data on arable 
land obtained from the FAO database. The price of 
land was obtained from three alternative sources: 
First, we used the average prices of agricultural land 
collected by Morandé & Soto (1992) during the 1975­
1989 period. Second, from 1999 to 2002, we used 
average agricultural land prices collected by Tobar 
(2003). Finally, we used the database from the Office 
of Agricultural Studies and Policies (ODEPA, 2013) 
for 2003 to 2010. It is necessary to highlight that 
these three datasets use the same source to collect the 
agricultural land prices – the ‘Revista del Campo’, 
which is a mainstream magazine with national 
coverage that focuses on agribusiness. 
The working capital was mainly proxied by fertili­
zers and pesticides (see, e.g., Sharma, 1991; Kuroda, 
1997). The FAO dataset provided import values and 
quantities for these two variables. However, for the 
specific case of Chile, there is no data available for 
quantities of pesticides. For this reason, we applied the 
use of fertilizers as a proxy for working capital2. 
By following Kuroda (1997) and Suhariyanto & 
Thintle (2001), we used imported tractors and crawlers 
as a proxy for fixed capital. Prices and quantities of this 
input were also obtained from the FAO database. 
In order to capture the evolution of aggregate 
technology, we followed Duguet & MacGarvie (2005) 
and Hadley (2006) and used patent applications as our 
proxy for this variable. These figures correspond to 
the number of patent applications emitted by residents 
and nonresidents. It was obtained from the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO, www.
wipo.int). Agricultural production was proxied by the 
Agricultural Production Index provided by the FAO 
dataset.
To capture the effect of farm protectionism, we 
used the NRA. Chile’s NRA was obtained from the 
world dataset elaborated by Anderson & Nelgen 
(2012). This measure represents the price gap caused 
by government distortions compared to a free market 
situation. It can be interpreted as the percentage in 
which protectionism increases the farm’s gross return 
in relation to the absence of this intervention. The NRA 
covers around 67% of livestock, 75% of oilseeds and 
tropical crops, and 83% of grains and tubers, which 
corresponds to the 85% of the world’s agricultural 
exports. The NRA considers price distortions for 
alternative farm products, which can be classified 
into import­competing and producers of exportables. 
As Anderson & Nelgen (2011) discuss, the source 
2Therefore, our results applied fertilizer as the input capturing working capital.
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of protectionism depends on the country’s level of 
development. Specifically, the main distortions for 
developing countries are seen in the import-competing 
products. This is clearly observed in Figure 1, which 
shows the evolution of the NRA for import and export 
products from 1973 to 2010. While the export NRA 
approaches zero during the majority of the period, the 
import NRA is mostly positive and varied greatly over 
the sample period. In spite of this issue, the export NRA 
is highly positive during the first and last period of our 
sample; this is why using an aggregate NRA is useful 
as it avoids misinterpreting the distortions introduced 
into the agricultural sector by the Chilean government. 
Our sample covers the period of 1973 to 2010. 
All prices were measured in dollars of 2005. This 
time period was only chosen for availability of 
information. Prices and quantities of each input 
allowed us to compute the shares of each input as 
the weight over the total agricultural production. 
Descriptive statistics of these shares and the NRA are 
discussed below.
Figure 1 presents the evolution of the NRA from 
1973 to 2010. At the beginning of this period, i.e., 
from 1974 to 1976, it exhibits negative values, which 
seem to be driven by the coup d'état in 1973. A drastic 
elimination of distortions in different sectors of the 
economy took place during this period in order to 
pursue a free­market economy. Starting in 1977, the 
NRA began to increase until the mid­1980s. This is 
interesting because, despite the free­market focus, we 
can observe an increasing pattern of farm protectionism. 
The end of 1980s shows a significant drop in the 
NRA, suggesting that the end of the dictatorial period 
also put an emphasis on eliminating distortions in the 
agricultural sector. We thought that Chile’s return to 
democracy in 1990 could have changed the focus of 
economic policies related to the agricultural sector. Yet, 
while there is an increase in the NRA during the 1990s, 
there is a clear decrease from 2000 to 2010. The general 
tendency of the NRA throughout the study period was 
to decline; however, it remained positive throughout 
most of the timeframe. So, in spite of the predominance 
of the free­market focus, farm protectionism was not 
totally eliminated during the period in analysis. In this 
way, it is interesting to investigate the effects of the 
positive yet decreasing trend of the NRA on Chile’s 
agricultural production. 
Table 1 presents the average annual growth rates of 
labor, fixed capital, working capital, and land shares in 
four periods, i.e., 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s. The 
first period, 1973­1980, was influenced by the profound 
economic crisis at the beginning of the 1970s and the 
subsequent reforms introduced in the Chilean economy 
to combat that crisis. These issues seemed to affect the 
labor and working capital shares, which presented high 
growth rates. In contrast, the fixed capital and land sha-
res had negative growth rates. This suggests that this 
period was dominated by an agricultural production 
that was intensive in labor and working capital. The 
second period, 1981­1990, coincides with the Latin 
American debt crisis at the beginning of the 1980s. 
It was also the beginning of the Chilean economy’s 
impressive growth in the mid­1980s. Labor’s share 
continued to increase, but there was a notable decrease 
in its growth rate. A greater decrease is observed in 
the working capital share, which presented a negative 
average in this period. Fixed capital and land share, 
on the other hand, presented positive and high growth 
rates. This implies that the agricultural production in 
the 1980s was dominated by the use of the land and 
fixed capital inputs. The 1990s was also an important 
decade for Chile because it is when the government 
Figure 1. Evolution of nominal rate of assistance (NRA). Source: Anderson & Nelgen 
(2012).
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returned to democracy. Fixed capital, working capital, 
and land shares decreased their relative importance in 
the agricultural production, as seen in their negative 
growth rates. The exception is the labor share, which 
continued to be positive. The final period, 2001­2010, 
revealed an increase in the importance of the working 
capital and land on the agricultural production since 
they were the only shares with positive growth rates. 
Interestingly, the last decade in our sample is the only 
period where the labor share lost importance in the 
agricultural production. In fact, the agricultural sector 
of developing countries is labor abundant (relative 
to land), with land being the main agricultural input. 
In order to analyze this issue, Figure 2 presents the 
evolution of the labor-land ratio. We can observe that 
labor took importance (relative to land) from 1973 to 
2000. Nevertheless, this ratio declined in the last decade 
of analysis, i.e., 2001-2010. The loss of importance 
of labor, relative to land, may suggest the beginning 
of a structural change in the Chilean agricultural 
sector. Another interesting issue is that neither of the 
technologies, i.e., biochemical or mechanical, had a 
predominance in the agricultural production of Chile. 
Biochemical technology was more important for 
agricultural production during the 1970s and 2000s, 
while mechanical technology was dominant during the 
1980s and 1990s. 
Results
First of all, we should note that our estimates presen-
ted significant autocorrelation of order one in the 
residuals. To solve this problem, we followed Sharma 
(1991) and assumed that the residuals of system of 
equations (1)-(3) follow an autoregressive process of 
order one. In this way, we added a lag of each residual 
in the system of equations (1)-(3), which provided 
estimates with no­autocorrelation. Specifically, we 
failed to reject the null of no autocorrelation at the 
conventional levels of significance. Table 2 presents 
these results which are discussed below.
The coefficient associated with the agricultural 
production index was insignificant for the labor, 
fixed capital, and land share equations. However, 
this coefficient had a t­statistic of 2.14, which was 
significant at the 10% level (and near the 5% level) for 
the working capital share equation. This implies that 
the production function is non-homothetic. Thus, it 
seemed appropriate to use a function that allows non-
homotheticity in order to avoid misleading our results.
Technological changes were neutral to the four 
inputs analyzed because all coefficients associated 
with the evolution of patents were insignificant at the 
conventional levels, and the evolution of patents was 
our proxy for the aggregate technology in the country. 
Figure 2. Evolution of the labor-land ratio. Source: Own elaboration with data from 
FAO (www.faostat.fao.org) for labor, and Morandé & Soto (1992) jointly with Tobar 
(2003) for land.
Table 1. Average annual growth rate of input shares (%).
Share 1973-1980 1981-1990 1991-2000 2001-2010 Overall
Labor 124.1 3.9 1.5 -0.1 24.9
Fixed capital -4.0 24.3 ­2.8 -1.3 4.7
Working capital 172.4 ­8.6 -5.3 23.0 35.1
Land -2.3 10.8 -7.2 1.4 0.9
Source: Own elaboration with data from FAO (www.faostat.fao.org), ODEPA (2013), 
INE (www.ine.cl), Morandé & Soto (1992) and Tobar (2003).
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The use of fixed capital, working capital, labor, and 
land were not affected by changes in the aggregate 
technology used in Chile. This outcome suggests that 
there is a weak link between the Chilean agricultural 
sector and the evolution of technology. Therefore, to 
stimulate technological innovation in agricultural 
production it is necessary to improve productivity in the 
Chilean agricultural sector. In fact, innovation surveys 
taken by the Ministry of Economy of Chile (2012) 
show that the agricultural sector showed the lowest 
degree of innovation during the 2007-2011 period. 
The relationship between the four agricultural 
inputs is summarized in Figure 3. The partial elas­
ticity of substitution between labor and fixed capital 
had a positive and significant sign. Given that impro­
vements in mechanical technology promote the 
substi tution between labor and fixed capital, this is 
an expected outcome. While the use of fixed capital, 
i.e., mechanical technology, was more intensive, the 
use of labor was less so. The elasticity of substitu t ion 
between working capital and labor was also positive – 
however, insignificant. This finding implies that these 
Table 2. Estimated coefficients for each input share equation and partial elasticities.
Labor Land Fixed capital Working capital
Coeff Est. SE Coeff Est. SE Coeff Est. SE Coeff Est. SE
αLL 0.12*** 0.01 αNL -0.07*** 0.01 αFL -0.01 0.01 αWL -0.04*** 6.5E-3
αLF -5.3E-3 0.01 αNF 5.5E-5 0.01 αFF -0.01 0.02 αWF 0.01* 7.3E-3
αLN -0.07*** 0.01 αNN 0.10*** 0.01 αFN 5.5E-5 0.01 αWN -0.03*** 6.7E-3
αLY 0.12 0.13 αNY -0.05 0.10 αFY -0.22 0.15 αWY 0.15* 0.07
αLT -0.01 0.05 αNT -0.03 0.04 αFT 0.06 0.06 αWT -0.02 0.03
αLA -0.22* 0.12 αNA 0.16 0.11 αFA 0.25* 0.13 αWA -0.19 0.12
ρL 0.79*** 0.19 ρL -0.15 0.18 ρL ­0.98*** 0.21 αW -0.27 0.16
ρF 0.36** 0.18 ρF 0.03 0.17 ρF -0.43** 0.19
ρN 0.21 0.16 ρN 0.62*** 0.16 ρN -0.67*** 0.18
αL 0.46 0.29 αN 0.26 0.20 αF 0.54* 0.32
Figure 3. Relation between agricultural inputs. W, F, N, and L stand for work-
ing capital, fixed capital, land, and labor respectively.
W F
LN
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. ρL, ρF, and ρN correspond to the lag of the residual of land, fixed 
capital, and land share equations, respectively. SE stands for standard error. 
Partial elasticities of substitution Est. SE
Labor­ Fixed capital 0.90*** 0.26
Labor-Land 0.35*** 0.09
Land­ Fixed capital 1.05 0.90
Working capital­Labor 4.7E-3 0.15
Working capital­ Fixed capital 3.82** 1.50
Working capital­Land -2.26*** 0.67
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inputs are neither substitutes nor complements. Thus, 
changes in the use of these inputs do not affect each 
other at all. Land and labor are substitutes because their 
elasticity of substitution was positive and significant 
at the 1% level. Therefore, the use of land (labor) 
discourages the use of labor (land). This can explain 
the different evolution seen in the annual growth rates 
of these inputs in Table 1. Land and fixed capital, on 
the other hand, are neither complements nor substitutes 
as this elasticity was insignificant at the conventional 
levels. This finding implies that increases in the use of 
mechanical technology will have no significant effect 
on the acquisition of agricultural land and vice versa. 
Working capital and land are complements at the 1% 
level of significance. Therefore, the use of one of these 
inputs stimulates the use of the other, e.g., increases in 
the use of biochemical technology can also increase 
the acquisition of land. This is an interesting result 
given that the use of biochemical technology can also 
increase the scarcity of land, which can have an effect 
on the price of this input. Finally, the positive and 
significant elasticity of substitution between working 
capital and fixed capital implies that these inputs are 
substitutes. Thus, the use of biochemical and mecha-
nical technology does not evolve simulta neously 
in the Chilean agricultural market. The substitution 
between these two inputs suggests that one of them has 
been more important in the agricultural production of 
Chile. The efficiency of biochemical and mechanical 
technologies depends upon the relative scarcity of labor. 
In particular, if labor is abundant relative to land, the 
use of biochemical technology is more efficient. This 
is the case in developing countries and should be the 
case in Chile as well. As the evidence in the descriptive 
statistic shows, the labor-land ratio increased during 
most of the study period. Therefore, biochemical 
technology (working capital) should be more important 
than mechanical technology (fixed capital), explaining 
the evolution of agricultural production in Chile.
Relevant information is provided by the magnitude 
of the partial elasticities of substitution. As Berhman 
(1972) discusses, the magnitude of the partial elasticity 
of substitution between labor and capital provides a 
measure of adjustment to international shocks. In parti­
cu lar, an inelastic elasticity, i.e., less than one, makes 
a country less flexible when confronting international 
disturbances. In our case, all the partial elasticities of 
substitution between labor and the different capital 
inputs studied, i.e., fixed capital, working capital, and 
land, were less than one. For this reason, we can infer 
a low degree of adjustment of the Chilean agricultural 
sector in the face of international shocks. This finding 
reveals fragility in the agricultural sector of Chile, and 
should be taken into consideration by policy makers.
In relation to farm protectionism, which is the 
focus of this study, important findings arose. First, 
farm protectionism is labor-saving. It seems that 
farmers do not use government transferences for 
additional workers. On the contrary, they seem to 
reallocate resources by using less agricultural labor. 
This issue is relevant since agricultural employment 
is mainly composed of low­skilled labor. Therefore, 
a decrease in agricultural labor can increase poverty 
by increasing unemployment of the poor. This effect 
might be more relevant in geographical areas where 
the agricultural sector is more important. This finding 
also suggests that farm protectionism could increase 
migration from the countryside to cities. Second, 
farm protectionism is fixed capital­using. This result 
suggests that fixed capital seems to be an important 
use of government transferences. Therefore, increases 
in farm protectionism can have an important effect 
on the demand for agricultural capital. In this way, an 
increase in agricultural capital price would be an ex­
pected outcome in an environment where government 
transferences to farmers are increased. This result could 
be driven by the different free­trade agreements signed 
by Chile, especially the one between China and Chile 
signed in 2005 that has opened the door for Chilean 
farmers to acquire cheap machinery, encouraging the 
use of fixed capital in the agricultural sector. Finally, 
farm protectionism is land and working capital neutral. 
Thus, the acquisition of agricultural land and working 
capital is not affected by government transferences to 
Chilean farmers. Hence, these two inputs do not seem 
to be an important endpoint for farm protectionism. 
The above findings indicate that there is only one clear 
impact of the use of government transferences: fixed 
capital. 
In order to check the robustness of our results, we 
performed three robustness checks. First, because 
aggregate technology was identified as neutral to 
the four inputs, we dropped this variable from the 
analysis (see model 2 in Table 3). All findings related 
to the substitution between labor and the additional 
agricultural inputs remained unchanged. The partial 
elasticities of substitution between working capital 
and fixed capital and between working capital and 
land, however, lost their significance. Therefore, the 
substitution between these inputs should be taken 
with caution. All results for farm protectionism 
were supported, with the exception that it becomes 
working capital­saving. This implies that increases 
in protectionism can decrease the use of biochemical 
technology. Interestingly, the production index was 
significant for three of the share equations, supporting 
the assertion that the production function is not 
homothetic. In addition, all elasticities between labor 
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Table 3. Robustness checks.
Share equation Coeff. (1)
Model 2 Model 3
Estimate(2) SE Estimate(2) SE
Labor αLL 0.12*** 0.01 0.13*** 6.4E-3
αLF -0.01* 0.01 -0.02*** 4.9E-3
αLN -0.07*** 0.01 -0.07*** 0.01
αLY 0.08* 0.04 - -
αLT - - 0.03* 0.01
αLA -0.24** 0.11 -0.25** 0.11
ρL 0.79*** 0.21 0.92*** 0.20
ρF 0.31 0.19 0.42** 0.18
ρN 0.20 0.17 0.22 0.17
αL 0.55*** 0.20 0.76*** 0.12
Fixed capital αFL -0.01* 0.01 -0.03*** 4.9E-3
αFF 0.01 0.01 0.02*** 0.01
αFN -0.01 0.01 2.4E-3 0.01
αFY -0.05 0.04 - -
αFT - - -9.3E-3 0.01
αFA 0.34*** 0.11 0.32*** 0.11
ρL -0.99*** 0.22 -1.16*** 0.20
ρF -0.40** 0.20 -0.52*** 0.19
ρN -0.64*** 0.17 -0.67*** 0.17
αF 0.22 0.20 0.02 0.11
Land αNL -0.07*** 8.3E­3 -0.07*** 7.0E-3
αNF ­8.9E­3 6.6E-3 2.4E-3 5.2E-3
αNN 0.10*** 0.01 0.10*** 0.01
αNY -0.12*** 0.03 - -
αNT - - -0.05*** 0.01
αNA 0.10 0.10 0.21** 0.10
ρL -0.20 0.19 -0.11 0.19
ρF -0.09 0.17 -0.04 0.17
ρN 0.65*** 0.15 0.60*** 0.15
αN 0.38** 0.16 0.21* 0.11
Working capital(3) αWL -0.04*** 5.8E­3 -0.03*** 4.9E-3
αWF 8.2E­3 5.7E-3 5.9E-4 5.0E-3
αWN -0.03*** 6.5E-3 -0.03*** 6.8E­3
αWY 0.09** 0.03 - -
αWT - - 0.04** 0.01
αWA -0.20* 0.10 ­0.28** 0.11
αW -0.16 0.14 1.6E-3 0.11
Partial elasticities of substitution
Labor-Physical capital 0.73*** 0.15 0.50*** 0.09
Labor-Land 0.38*** 0.08 0.34*** 0.07
Land-Physical capital -3.24 3.60 1.20** 0.45
Working capital­Labor 0.09 0.13 0.25** 0.11
Working capital­Physical capital 10.04 10.08 1.12 1.04
Working capital­Land -7.26 11.00 -2.17** 0.69
(1)ρL , ρF and ρN correspond to the lag of the residual of land, fixed capital, and land share equations, 
respectively. (2)***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. (3)These estimates 
where obtained by using the estimates of the system of equations and the constraints in (4). Model 2 
does not consider technology in the estimation. Model 3 assumes homotheticity, i.e., does not consider 
production level in the estimation.
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and the capital inputs remained less than one, which 
re­confirms the fragility of the Chilean agricultural 
sector.
Second, we imposed homotheticity in the 
production function in order to see which results were 
sensitive to this strong assumption (see model 3 in 
Table 3). Farm protectionism continued being labor-
saving and fixed capital­using. Technological changes 
were only neutral for fixed capital, but they became 
labor­saving and working capital­ and land­using. In 
relation to the partial elasticities of substitution, we 
noted changes in their significances but not in their 
signs. Labor was still a substitute of fixed capital and 
land, and working capital was still a complement 
of land. However, land and fixed capital, and also 
labor and working capital, became substitutes. In 
addition, the partial elasticity of substitution between 
working capital and fixed capital was insignificant. 
Because there was a significant coefficient for the 
production index, our results suggest that imposing a 
homothetic production function can introduce bias in 
the interpretation of some of our results. Interestingly, 
all partial elasticities of substitution between labor and 
capital inputs remained less than one, which confirms 
the weakness of the Chilean agricultural sector in the 
face of international disturbances. 
Finally, we performed three additional experi­
ments. First, we used pesticides rather than fertilizers 
as the proxy for the working capital. Since we had 
the value for this input but not its quantity, we used 
the fertilizers’ quantity to estimate its share and 
price3. Second, we used an adjusted price for the 
fixed capital by following Kuroda (1997). The price 
of fixed capital was defined as PT (r+d), where PT 
is the price of tractors, r is the average loan rate 
(obtained from Chilean Central Bank data base) and 
d is the depreciation rate obtained from the identity 
Kt ≡ It − (1 − d) Kt − 1. Kt is the stock of agricultural 
capital (obtained from the FAO database) and It  is the 
investment in the agricultural sector proxied by the 
total gross capital formation multiplied by the share of 
the agricultural sector in the GDP (obtained from the 
Chilean Central Bank database). Finally, because we 
did not have the land price for the first two years in our 
sample, which were forecasted by a linear trend, we 
dropped these two first observations from the sample 
period. Results from these three robustness checks are 
not shown for the sake of space; nevertheless, none 
of them changed our main results. They are available 
upon request. 
Discussion
The objective of this paper is to investigate how 
farm protectionism affects the use of agricultural in puts 
in Chile. In order to pursue this objective, we estimated 
partial elasticities of substitution, which also allowed 
us to observe how increases in the use of a specific 
input affect the use of others. This paper contributes 
to the agricultural literature by providing empirical 
evidence on the impacts of farm protectionism 
in a country that experienced liberalization in its 
agricultural sector. Specifically, we investigated how 
Chilean farmers allocated government transferences 
among different agricultural inputs. This topic has 
important implications for policy development. Firstly, 
identifying farms’ use of government transfers helps 
to anticipate effects on farm input demands, i.e. 
to anticipate changes in the prices of these inputs. 
Secondly, the effect of protectionism on labor input 
is important because a decrease in agricultural labor 
demand, for example, can have a harmful effect 
on poor workers who are mainly employed by the 
agricultural sector. Finally, studying partial elasticities 
of substitution allows for us to identify the degree of 
flexibility of the agricultural sector when faced with 
international shocks.
We used the traditional approach used to estimate 
the partial elasticities of substitution in the agricultural 
sector (Berndt & Wood, 1975; Sharma, 1991; Kuroda, 
1997) by introducing farm protectionism as a factor in 
agricultural production. In the spirit of Henessy (1998), 
we allowed government assistance to affect the use 
of inputs. Transferences or subsidies can be used to 
increase the level of some inputs in order to increase 
productivity (Giannakas et al., 2001; Karagiannis 
& Sarris, 2005; Guan & Lansink, 2006). Thus, farm 
protectionism stimulates production through its effect 
on labor, working capital, fixed capital, and/or land. 
By using annual Chilean data from the period of 
1973 to 2010, and using the Nominal Rate of Assistance 
(NRA) in order to capture farm protectionism, our main 
findings reveal that protectionism decreases the use of 
labor and increases the use of fixed capital; therefore, 
protectionism makes Chilean agricultural production 
more fixed capital­intensive. This finding also shows 
that future increases in farm transferences could have 
negative effects on agricultural labor. In contrast, 
protectionism does not affect the use of working 
capital and land. This indicates that demand for these 
inputs will not be affected when governments increase 
3Note that we could not add fertilizers and pesticides as a whole proxy for working capital for two reasons: First, data on pesticide quantities was not 
available, and, second, adding prices (or quantities) for these two inputs to obtain a proxy for the price of working capital would be a questionable 
assumption. Furthermore, we could not use pesticides as an additional input in our estimates since fertilizers and pesticides are proxies for the same 
input.
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transferences to farmers4. Moreover, all elasticities 
of substitution between labor and capital, i.e., fixed 
capital, working capital, and land, were found to be 
less than one. This outcome reveals a low degree of 
adjustment of the Chilean agricultural sector in the face 
of international disturbances, which supports the claims 
of Berhman (1972). 
Studying the agricultural sector is important for 
developing countries since it is one of the main 
components that can drive their economic growth. 
One characteristic that distinguishes this sector 
from others is a high amount of farm protectionism. 
This is a controversial topic given that there are two 
contradictory lines of research that can either support 
or reject the use of farm protectionism. In such an 
environment, geography, history, institutions, farm 
structure, farmer organization, democracy, and the 
agricultural multi-functionality characteristic (see 
e.g., Dibden et al., 2009; Swinnen, 2010; Moon & 
Pino, 2018) are indicated as potential drivers of the 
different effects of liberalization on the agricultural 
sector. The aim of this paper is not to support or 
reject farm protectionism, but to provide information 
on how it is involved in agricultural production. In 
fact, we took a different perspective by analyzing the 
effects of farm protectionism on the use of agricultural 
inputs. This is useful to better understand the effect that 
protectionism has on the agricultural sector, especially 
when studying a country that has experienced an 
aggressive liberalization in the agricultural sector. For 
this purpose, we studied the production process of the 
Chilean agricultural sector by estimating the partial 
elasticities of substitution among agricultural inputs. 
By using annual Chilean data from 1973 to 
2010, our robust findings can be summarized as 
follows: First, farm protectionism decreases the use 
of labor and increases the use of fixed capital. This 
implies that protectionism encourages the Chilean 
agricultural sector to become more capital-intensive. 
Farm protectionism, then, is a recommended policy if 
the objective of policy makers is to update production 
processes in the agricultural sector. Nevertheless, 
protectionism decreases the use of agricultural 
labor, which can cause an increase in agricultural 
unemployment and negatively affect the poorer 
segments of society. Moreover, protectionism does not 
have an effect on land and working capital. Second, we 
identified pairs of inputs that are substitutes and that 
can evolve differently over time, i.e., fixed capital ­ 
labor, land ­ labor, working capital ­ land, and working 
capital ­ fixed capital. In contrast, working capital and 
land can evolve similarly over time because they are 
complements. In addition, we found evidence that 
there is no relation between the use of inputs for two 
of these pairs, i.e., working capital − labor and land −
fixed capital. Third, technological changes do not have 
a significant impact on the use of agricultural inputs. 
This finding reveals that other sectors of the Chilean 
economy seem to be benefited by technological 
changes. Finally, the elasticities of substitution between 
labor and fixed capital, working capital, and land are 
less than one. This finding is relevant because it 
reveals a weakness in the Chilean agricultural sector. 
Specifically, this result indicates an inability, or poor 
ability, of the Chilean agricultural sector to confront 
international shocks. This outcome may be related with 
the low degree of innovation in the Chilean agricultural 
sector. For this reason, encouraging the incorporation of 
new technologies and methods into Chilean agricultural 
production is recommended in order to avoid negative 
impacts caused by international shocks.
References
Ahmed R, 1995. Liberalization of agricultural input markets 
in Bangladesh: Process, impact, and lessons. Agr Econ 12: 
115­128. 
Ahmed R, 1996. Agricultural market reforms in South 
Asia. Am J Agr Econ 78: 815­819. https://doi.
org/10.2307/1243311
Anderson K, 1992. Agricultural trade liberalisation and the 
environment: a global perspective. World Econ 15: 153-
172. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467­9701.1992.tb00801.x
Anderson K, Nelgen S, 2011. What's the appropriate 
agricultural protection counterfactual for trade analysis? 
In: Unfinished business? The WTO’s Doha development 
agenda; Martin W, Mattoo A (eds.). pp: 325-354. World 
Bank, Washington DC.
Anderson K, Nelgen S, 2012. Trade barrier volatility and 
agricultural price stabilization. World Dev 40: 36­48. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2011.05.018
Anderson K, Rausser G, Swinnen J, 2013. Political economy 
of public policies: insights from distortions to agricultural 
and food markets. J Econ Lit 51: 423­477. https://doi.
org/10.1257/jel.51.2.423
Anowor OF, Ukweni NO, Martins I, 2013. The impact of 
trade liberalisation on Nigeria agricultural sector. J Econ 
Sust Dev 4: 14-24.
Barten A, 1969. Maximum likelihood estimation of a 
complete system of demand equations. Eur Econ Rev 1: 
7-73. https://doi.org/10.1016/0014­2921(69)90017­8
Behrman J, 1972. Sectoral elasticities of substitution between 
capital and labor in a developing economy: times series 
4This assumes that the mix of future distortions is similar to the one observed in past.
Gabriel Pino and Ariel Soto-Caro
Spanish Journal of Agricultural Research March 2019 • Volume 17 • Issue 1 • e0107
12
analysis in the case of postwar Chile. Econometrica 40: 
311-326. https://doi.org/10.2307/1909409
Berndt E, Wood D, 1975. Technology, prices, and the derived 
demand for energy. Rev Econ Stat 57: 259­268. https://
doi.org/10.2307/1923910
Binswanger H, Deininger K, 1997. Explaining agricultural 
and agrarian policies in developing countries. J Econ Lit 
35: 1958­2005.
Boot JCG, Van Der Zee F, 1993. The political economy of 
agricultural policies: A survey. Eur Rev Agr Econ 20: 261-
290. https://doi.org/10.1093/erae/20.3.261
Bouët A, Bureau JC, Decreux Y, Jean S, 2005. Multilateral 
agricultural trade liberalisation: The contrasting fortunes 
of developing countries in the Doha round. World 
Econ 28: 1329­1354. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-
9701.2005.00736.x
Cavallo D, Mundlak Y, 1982. Agriculture and economic 
growth in an open economy: The case of Argentina. Intl 
Food Policy Res Inst, Washington DC.
Chiquiar D, Hanson GH, 2005. International migration, self­
selection, and the distribution of wages: Evidence from 
Mexico and the United States. J Polit Econ 113: 239­281. 
https://doi.org/10.1086/427464
De Albuquerque M, Dirven M, Vogelgesang F, 2000. 
The impact of the new economic model on Latin Ame-
rica's agriculture. World Dev 28: 1673­1688. https://doi.
org/10.1016/S0305-750X(00)00047-4
Dibden J, Potter C, Cocklin C, 2009. Contesting the neoliberal 
project for agriculture: Productivist and multifunctional 
trajectories in the European Union and Australia. J 
Rural Stud 25: 299­308. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
jrurstud.2008.12.003
Diewert W, 1974. Applications of duality theory in frontiers 
of quantitative economics. American Elsevier.
Duguet E, MacGarvie, 2005. How well do patent citations 
measure flows of technology? Evidence from French 
innovation surveys. Econ Inn New Tech 14: 375-393. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/1043859042000307347
Giannakas K, Schoney R, Tzouvelekas V, 2001. Technical 
efficiency, technological change and output growth of 
wheat farms in Saskatchewan. Can J Agr Econ 49: 135­
152. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1744­7976.2001.tb00295.x
Gibbon P, 1999. Free competition without sustainable 
development? Tanzanian cotton sector liberalisation, 
1994/95 to 1997/98. J Dev Stud 36: 128­150. https://doi.
org/10.1080/00220389908422615
Guan Z, Lansink AO, 2006. The source of productivity 
growth in Dutch agriculture: A perspective from finance. 
Am J Agr Econ 88: 644­656. https://doi.org/10.1111/
j.1467­8276.2006.00885.x
Hadley D, 2006. Patterns in technical efficiency and technical 
change at the farm­level in England and Wales, 1982­
2002. J Agr Econ 57: 81­100. https://doi.org/10.1111/
j.1477­9552.2006.00033.x
Henessy D, 1998. The production effects of agricultural 
income policies under uncertainty. Am J Agr Econ 80: 46­
57. https://doi.org/10.2307/3180267
Hertel T, Keeney R, 2006. What's at stake: The relative 
importance of import barriers, export subsidies and 
domestic support. In: Agricultural trade reform and the 
Doha development agenda; Anderson, Martin (eds.). 
World Bank, Washington DC.
Hollander S, 1992. Malthus's abandonment of agricultural 
protectionism: a discovery in the history of economic 
thought. Am Econ Rev 82: 650­659.
Ingco M, Nash J, 2004. Agriculture and the WTO: creating a 
trading system for development. World Bank, Washington 
DC.
Jayne TS, Govereh J, Mwanaumo A, Nyoro JK, Chapoto A, 
2002. False promise or false premise? The experience of 
food and input market reform in Eastern and Southern 
Africa. World Dev 30: 1967­1985. https://doi.org/10.1016/
S0305­750X(02)00115­8
Karagiannis G, Sarris A, 2005. Measuring and explaining 
scale efficiency with the parametric approach: the case of 
Greek tobacco growers. Agr Econ 33: 441­451. https://
doi.org/10.1111/j.1574­0864.2005.00084.x
Kuroda Y, 1997. Research and extension expenditures 
and productivity in Japanese agriculture, 1960-1990. 
Agr Econ 16: 111-124. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0169-
5150(96)01221-2
Larrain F, 1982. Proteccionismo y desarrollo económico. 
Estudios Públicos 7: 61-75.
Lederman D, Maloney WF, Servén L, 2004. Lessons from 
NAFTA: for Latin America and the Caribbean. World 
Bank, Washington DC. https://doi.org/10.1596/0­8213­
5813­8
Lusk J, 2012. The political ideology of food. Food Policy 37: 
530-542. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.foodpol.2012.05.002
McCalla A, 2003. Liberalizing agricultural trade: will it ever 
be a reality? J Agr Resour Econ 28: 419­434.
McCloud N, Kumbhakar S, 2008. Do subsidies drive 
productivity? A cross-country analysis of Nordic 
dairy farms. In: Advances in econometrics: Bayesian 
econometrics; Chib S, Griffiths W, Koop G, Terrell D 
(eds), Vol 23, pp: 245–274. Emerald Group Publ Ltd. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0731­9053(08)23008­2
Ministry of Economy of Chile, 2012. Séptima Encuesta 
Nacional de Innovación de las Empresas. Departamento 
de Investigación y Desarrollo, Instituto Nacional de 
Estadísticas, Chile.
Moon W, Griffith J, 2011. Assessing holistic economic value 
for multifunctional agriculture in the US. Food Policy 36: 
455-465. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.foodpol.2011.05.003
Moon W, Pino G, 2018. Do US citizens support government 
intervention in agriculture? Implications for the political 
economy of agricultural protection. Agr Econ 49: 119-
129. https://doi.org/10.1111/agec.12400
Impact of farm protectionism on the use of agricultural inputs in Chile
Spanish Journal of Agricultural Research March 2019 • Volume 17 • Issue 1 • e0107
13
Morandé F, Soto R, 1992. Una nota sobre la construcción de 
series de precios de activos reales: tierra y casas en Chile 
(1976­1989). Rev An Econ 7: 169­177.
Naoi M, Kume I, 2011. Explaining mass support for 
agricultural protectionism: evidence from a survey 
experiment during the global recession. Int Organ 65: 771­
795. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818311000221
ODEPA, 2013. Chilean agriculture overview. Office of 
Agricultural Policies, Trade and Information, Ministry of 
Agriculture, Chile. https://www.odepa.gob.cl/ 
Panagariya A, 2005. Agricultural liberalisation and the least 
developed countries: six fallacies. World Econ 28: 1277­
1299. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467­9701.2005.00734.x
Rafeek MIM, Samaratunga PA, 2000. Trade liberalisation and 
its impact on the rice sector of Sri Lanka. Sri Lankan J Agr 
Econ 3: 143-154. https://doi.org/10.4038/sjae.v3i0.3494
Sharma S, 1991. Technological change and elasticities of 
substitution in Korean agriculture. J Dev Econ 35: 147-
172. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304­3878(91)90071­3
Suhariyanto K, Colin T, 2001. Asian agricultural productivity 
and convergence. J Agr Econ 52: 96-110. https://doi.
org/10.1111/j.1477­9552.2001.tb00941.x
Swinnen J, 1994. A positive theory of agricultural 
protection. Am J Agr Econ 76: 1-14. https://doi.
org/10.2307/1243915
Swinnen J, 2010. The political economy of agricultural and 
food policies: recent contributions, new insights, and areas 
for further research. Appl Econ Perspect P 32: 33­58. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/aepp/ppp012
Tobar P, 2003. Evolución del precio de la tierra y de la 
rentabilidad de la agricultura chilena entre el período 1983 
y 2002. Doctoral Thesis. Universidad de Talca, Facultad 
de Cs. Agrarias, Talca, Chile.
Valdés A, 1993. Mix and sequencing of economy wide 
and agricultural reforms: Chile and New Zealand. J 
Agr Econ 8: 295­311. https://doi.org/10.1016/0169-
5150(93)90039-Fhttps://doi.org/10.1016/0169-
5150(95)01141-7
